O Modelo discursivo de Klaus Günther: contributos para uma Teoria da Argumentação Jurídica

Abstract

This article examines Klaus Günther’s theory of legal argumentation, focusing on three key contributions: the distinction between discourses of justification and application, the normative conception of coherence, and  the role of interpretative paradigms. Günther’s framework provides an innovative response to the tension between universality and particularity in the application of law. Coherence operates not as a validity criterion but as a regulative principle guiding the correct application of legal norms. Interpretative paradigms function as mediating mechanisms that reconcile normative demands with the practical constraints inherent in legal decision-making. Furthermore, the theory carries significant implications for the judicial function, democratic legitimacy, and the critique of value-based jurisprudence. The article concludes that Günther’s discursive model represents a substantive reformulation of contemporary legal rationality.